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20th Century physics has been struck by a series of shocking results that have raised issues 
with regards to what knowledge can be accessed about nature, what knowledge can be 
derived from our physical theories and, in general, has led to various debates about what 
physics actually is. It is tempting to think those existential crises in physics are fairly new. In 
this essay, we will argue that they have always existed, even before what we now call the 
scientific revolution. Instead of being a problem, proposing answers to apparently undecidable 
questions and asserting one’s stance in spite of uncertainty could well be a defining feature of 
physics and science at large.  
We shall illustrate and develop our claim by first reminding the history of one particular 
long-standing question in physics which has had, and still does have, a dramatic impact on 
our world view. We will then turn to more general notions of undecidability within physics and 
ask if there is any connection to similar concepts in computing and mathematics. Next, we will 
discuss the relationship between philosophical and scientific questions in the context of 
undecidability, before returning to some contemporary examples. Finally, we shall discuss the 
problem of consciousness in light of the thesis we develop herein. 
 
 
The Celestial Waltz: Who is Leading? 
 
Most children are taught that, although the Sun appears to orbit the Earth, in actual fact it 
is the Earth that is orbiting the Sun. Inquisitive pupils may wonder how and why this inaccurate 
world view managed to last for more than two millennia! While it is easy to dismiss such 
questions by claiming that people then were just ignorant until the scientific revolution, such 
an answer does not do justice to the intellectual challenge that the pioneers of the scientific 
revolution had to overcome. 
Let us convince ourselves with a simple model. In Fig. 1(a) we can clearly recognise the 
distinctive Keplerian paths drawn by the planets as they orbit the Sun. Likewise, the 
astronomers among us will recognise the equally distinctive retrograde motions of Mars about 
the Earth in Fig.1(b)1. When deciding between the heliocentric or the geocentric models’ 
worldviews, it is tempting to think that we only need to point a telescope towards the sky in 
order to see the answer. However, Fig.1(c) and Fig.1(d) show that providing an answer to 
“which world view is real?” is not so simple. By removing the “trails” drawn by the planets along 
their trajectories, we see that the actual relative position (and in fact the relative motions too) 
are entirely equivalent in the two models. This is not surprising since the mathematical 
operation we have applied between the two Keplerian views is global and therefore affects the 
position of all bodies in the same manner, thus leaving invariant their relative motion. 
 
 
1 The trajectories of the geocentric model were obtained by applying a global change of coordinates to the 
heliocentric trajectories so as to pin the position of the Earth. In practice, the way it is done is by applying the 
parallelogram rule. Indeed, if 𝐸 stands for the Earth, 𝑆 for the Sun and 𝑃 for any other planet then  𝐸𝑃$$$$$⃗ (𝑡) =𝐸𝑆$$$$$⃗ (𝑡) + 𝑆𝑃$$$$⃗ (𝑡) = 𝑆𝑃$$$$⃗ (𝑡) − 𝑆𝐸$$$$$⃗ (𝑡) where the vectors 𝑆𝑃$$$$⃗  are obtained from the heliocentric model. 
 
Figure 1: Computer generated heliocentric vs geocentric viewpoints of the motion of the Sun 
(Yellow), Earth (Blue) and Mars (Red). Trajectories in the geocentric model (b) are obtained by 
applying a coordinate transformation to the trajectories of the heliocentric model (a). Frames (c) 
and (d) are copies of frames (a) and (b) where the planets’ path has been removed. Images (e) 
and (f) were obtained from Ref. [1] and represent a geocentric view as depicted in the Ptolemaic 
model using epicycles.  
 
The fact that simply looking at the sky won’t do, no matter how precise our measurements 
are and no matter how many celestial bodies we are able to observe, is called kinematic 
equivalence. The impossibility of deciding between two competing world views or theories, 
solely by measuring the quantities necessary for their description, illustrates what is called 
underdetermination of theory by evidence in the philosophy of science [2]. When two theories 𝑇! and 𝑇" are both consistent with the empirical evidence 𝐸, we are unable to decide between 
them: 𝑇!	entails	𝐸	 𝑇"	entails	𝐸	 																										𝐸	is	the	case																										 										Either	𝑇!	or	𝑇"	could	be	true	or	neither									 
 
In short, based on the description and measurement of motion alone, it is empirically 
undecidable to know whether the Sun is orbiting the Earth or vice versa. We can only say that 
either 𝑇! or 𝑇" could be true.      
How can one then decide which theory is correct, or if either is correct at all? The dominant 
world view must be selected via the application of additional rules that supposedly grant the 
ability to decipher reality from illusion. In antiquity the emphasis was on sense-data and 
aesthetics. For example, from this perspective, the belief that the Earth is moving cannot be 
justified if we do not feel its motion. Consequently, Aristotle developed a cosmological model 
grounded in sense data, final causes and aesthetics. This was a geocentric world view with 
concentric spheres each containing one of the known planets.  
Aristotle’s model was eventually replaced by the much more successful geocentric model 
of Ptolemy, which kept much of the Aristotelean philosophy but supplemented it with new 
concepts; the idea of epicycles is central to his theory. The qualitative similarity between the 
Keplerian trajectories depicted in Fig.1(b) and the Ptolemaic trajectories depicted in Fig.1(e) 
is striking. 
Fourteen centuries later Copernicus realised that a simpler model, which retained the 
aesthetic ideal of circular trajectories in the Heavens, was possible if the geocentric worldview 
was abandoned. Thus, despite having no empirical evidence (i.e. evidence grounded in 
sense-data) that Earth is moving about the Sun, Copernicus proposed arguments for why this 
was indeed the case. He argued that our senses might be liable and contended that simplicity 
must prevail above all other rules. Influential scholars such as Kepler and Galileo went on to 
contribute by further advocating for the rationality of the heliocentric view.  
Then came Isaac Newton and his Principia. In his treaty on the mathematical principles of 
natural philosophy Newton does much more than simply stating his famous three laws of 
motion. On their own, these laws have a big flaw: while they rely on an absolute conception 
of space and time, it is prima facie undecidable to know which frames of reference are 
privileged enough to be in simple uniform rectilinear motion with respect to absolute space. 
The theoretical framework built by Newton in the first two books of Principia is like an arch in 
construction; the keystone, which gives the whole structure its integrity, is found in Book III 
where Newton discusses the Solar System. Here, Newton requires four additional rules of 
reasoning (simplicity, universality of effects, universality of qualities and rational induction). 
Combining these rules and his three laws of motion, he concludes that a) the Sun is almost 
identifiable as the centre of absolute space and that b) the planets, including the Earth, draw 
elliptic orbits which have their common focus at the centre of the Sun. This newly developed 
theoretical framework put the final nail in the coffin of geocentricism and has reigned supreme 
ever since. 
 
Fifty shades of undecidability in science 
 
The detailed example discussed in the previous section has shown that scholars were 
confronted with a form of undecidability, called underdetermination, with regards to the place 
of the Earth in the Universe. In the daily practice of science there is a further distinction to be 
made, however, between two forms of underdetermination: holistic [2] and contrastive [3].   
Holistic underdetermination refers to underdetermination in response to failed predictions; 
one is unable to effectively isolate individual hypotheses from the ‘web’ of supporting 
assumptions and identify flaw(s) in an incorrect theory. A good example of holistic 
underdetermination is the failure of Newton’s law of gravitation to accurately predict the orbit 
of Uranus during the 1st half of the 19th Century. Rather than rejecting Newton’s model, 
Bouvard argued that there might instead be an unknown planet that perturbs Uranus. If 
hypothesis 1 (𝐻!) is Newton’s law of gravitation, hypothesis 2 (𝐻") is that there are 7 planets 
in the solar system, and	𝑃	refers to a prediction regarding the orbit of Uranus, the logical 
structure of this holistic underdetermination is: 
 (𝐻!	and	𝐻")	entails	𝑃 																							It	is	not	the	case	that	𝑃																							 								Either	𝐻!	is	false, 𝐻"	is	false	or	both	are	false							 
 
In response to a failed prediction, there is no logical basis on which to differentiate the status 
of 𝐻! or 𝐻". In other words, not observing	𝑃 does not permit one to single out 𝐻! or 𝐻" as a 
false premise. The decision to discard one or both of the hypotheses must therefore be based 
on ampliative principles.  
Contrastive underdetermination is a form of radical scepticism that calls into question any 
theory, no matter how consistent it is with empirical evidence, on the basis that there is a 
possibly infinite number of alternative theories which, “for want of anything analogous in our 
experience, our minds are unfitted to conceive”. The geocentric view, for example, held its 
as this to last for so long it must be “true” in some absolute sense, it was eventually superseded 
by a heliocentric view justified by the Newtonian framework. 
Looking more closely at scientific practice across the ages, different forms of 
“undecidability” pertaining to the validity of scientific claims have been pointed out by past 
thinkers. Identifying these different forms of undecidability can help us further appreciate which 
aspects of scientific practice are concerned with a form of undecidability.  
Hume’s problem of induction, for example, contends that the traditional view - that scientific 
laws are simply inferred from repeatable observations - cannot be logically valid. For this to 
be valid it is required that infinitely many repetitions of the same experiment are performed, 
which is impossible in a finite amount of time.  A connection can then be proposed between 
contrastive underdetermination on the one hand and Hume’s problem of induction on the 
other. Both are inextricably related to empirical observation and the logical invalidity of a form 
of inductive reasoning: in a theoretical sense for the former and in an empirical sense for the 
latter. Indeed, Hume’s induction problem offers a new perspective about contrastive 
underdetermination. In order to answer a question such as ‘is theory 𝑇 the best theory?’, it is 
necessary to generalise about an entire class, possibly infinite, of objects (all theories except 
for 𝑇) based only on a limited number of comparisons. When Reichenbach said that the 
principle of induction was “the means whereby science decides upon truth”, it seems he may 
have been correct in more ways than one. The issue here is that even if every theory tested 
so far against theory 𝑇 is deemed inferior to it, it is always possible that the next theory will be 
superior. 
 
 
Figure 2: “If you don’t know where you’re going, any road can take you there.” 
 
Closer to our contemporary scientific practice, problems arise when making computer-
based predictions for very large systems [4]. When bridging microscopic and macroscopic 
models of physical systems via the thermodynamic limit, a form of invalid induction occurs 
whereby one extrapolates a finite size or finite time behaviour to infinity. In absence of specific 
redundancies in the model, such strategies are a priori unjustified, and the model should be 
run on time and length scales so as to be as close as possible to the real system they seek to 
characterise. But even then, the halting problem states that there is no universal algorithm to 
determine whether such a computation is ever going to terminate on any given input (e.g. 
initial conditions); which can demonstrably lead to practical problems in theoretical physics [5].  
Finally, algorithmic undecidability is closely related to the undecidability of questions which 
can be expressed within first order predicate logic: although this formal system is consistent 
and all true propositions in it are provable, checking with some automated procedure whether 
a given proposition is actually true is subject, in principle, to the same algorithmic 
undecidability as that described above. For example, some recent work [6] has shown that the 
band-gap problem of condensed-matter physics was both computationally and logically 
undecidable. The similarity of the questions “will the next step in an algorithm be terminal?” 
and “will the next theory be better than theory 𝑇?” suggests that the problem of induction is a 
point of contact between different notions of undecidability in the scientific practice. A question 
then remains: surrounded by all these forms of undecidability, how do scientists decide 
anything at all? 
 
 
The art of taking a stance  
 
In his book The British Empiricists, S. Priest defines a philosophical question as “one for 
which we have no method for answering”. On this view, the task of philosophers is precisely 
to grapple with such undecidable questions and to suggest potential avenues for resolution. 
In the present essay we define a scientific question as a question deriving from a philosophical 
question once a method of resolution, usually involving mathematics, empirical knowledge 
and ampliative assumptions, has been proposed. In substance, what these ampliative 
principles do is transform an inductive inference into a deductive one, thus enabling closure. 
Scientists, in turn, are those tasked with answering such decidable scientific questions. Our 
main thesis in the essay is therefore that proposing an answer to undecidable questions 
becomes a defining feature of scientific practice, and that this is where philosophy and science 
interface. We believe this view opens-up new perspectives about the relation between science 
and philosophy, as we shall discuss below. 
Based on the view we put forward, the famous statement by B. Russell that - questions 
which are already capable of definite answers are placed in the sciences, while those only to 
which, at present, no definite answer can be given, remain to form the residue which is called 
philosophy - was tautological; scientists give answers to scientific questions that are by 
definition outside of philosophy. What this means is that philosophical questions do play a role 
in the emergence of new scientific questions but more as a ‘parent question’ giving rise to 
‘daughter questions’ than as a ‘travelling question’ moving from philosophy to science. Thus, 
a philosophical question always cohabits with its derived scientific questions, however 
prominent these scientific questions (and their answers) may be.  
We have seen how Aristotle, Copernicus and Newton each proposed a different scientific 
question in response to the same philosophical question about the place of the Earth in the 
Universe. They were also acting as scientists in that they each provided answers to their own 
scientific recasting of the philosophical question, and each of them succeeded in convincing 
parts of their contemporaries that the proposed methods of resolution were better than the 
proposed alternatives. We claim that this process is an essential feature of science. 
As another example we might consider the long-standing philosophical question of whether 
matter is discrete or continuous. Democritus, Parmenides, Lucretius and much later Dalton, 
Boltzmann and Einstein held an atomistic view of the world and developed convincing 
arguments accordingly. In parallel, Aristotle, Plato, and much later, Loschmidt, Mach and 
Ostwald developed views of matter based on continuous space-filling substances. Each of 
these thinkers had strong enough arguments to propose scientific questions, the answers to 
which would provide temporary closure on whether matter is particulate or not. It is also 
insightful to look at contemporary discussions on the subject. While we teach and celebrate 
atomism in the light of Einstein’s 1905 seminal paper on Brownian motion, the world view 
suggested by Quantum Field Theory appeals to a reality of space-filing fields of which particles 
are but mere excitations [7]. This is a striking example of a philosophical question that has 
survived in spite of the many scientific paradigms it has engendered. Scientists perpetually 
reformulate a given philosophical question into scientific questions by taking a stance, and in 
doing so often provide closure, if only for a few generations.  
The title of this essay implies there is an ‘art’ involved in taking a stance. This suggestion 
is intended to pay tribute to the inventiveness that is required to recast a philosophical question 
as a scientific one. The act of producing transformative art is always risky and the same might 
be said for science: the audacity required to take a stance, i.e. to make assumptions for which 
there are no empirical justifications, and to follow wherever these may lead, is necessary for 
scientific development.  
We end this section by commenting on the status of mathematics relative to the sciences. 
While mathematics does contribute to many sciences, it is often debated whether or not it is 
a science in and of itself. On the view we have developed here, the very fact that conjectures 
are commonplace in mathematics, even though they may never be formally proven or 
disproven, is evidence that mathematicians are also confronted with undecidable questions 
and consequently do need to take a stance in their practice. In that sense, therefore, 
mathematics as a discipline does indulge in the same ‘dark arts’ as the sciences.  
 
Crisis or the new normal? 
 
So far, we have developed the thesis that being confronted with undecidable philosophical 
questions and proposing decidable ‘daughter questions’, or scientific questions, is a defining 
feature of scientific practice. According to Kuhn, it is during the pre-paradigm or crisis stages 
of the development of a scientific discipline in which scientists tend to conceive of alternative 
theories: “… since no experiment can be conceived without some sort of theory… It is, I think, 
particularly in periods of acknowledged crisis that scientists have turned to philosophical analysis 
as a device for unlocking the riddles of their field.” 
In this view, each time a scientific discipline appears to be in crisis, it naturally reaches a 
‘new normal’, where the principles on which its answers are based are reinvented from a 
philosophical perspective. This seems to fit perfectly with our description of the interplay 
between philosophy and science, whereby scientific questions are reformulated by the 
refocussing of philosophical questions during times of scientific crisis.   
We shall quickly have a look at some of the 20th Century crises in physics, namely chaos 
and quantum mechanics and the kind of ‘new normal’ they have led to. 
Although Newton’s theory of gravitation predicted the orbits of individual planets such as 
Earth around the sun, as soon as a third body such as the moon was added, it became 
seemingly impossible to solve the equations explicitly within the Newtonian framework. 
Poincaré suggested that the three-body problem would require new mathematical tools that 
had yet to be invented, and Hadamard even suggested that such systems obeyed no laws at 
all. Much later, E. Lorenz found that sensitivity to initial conditions also occurred during the 
numerical simulations of simple dissipative systems. In principle, the initial state of a system 
is a point in some multidimensional ‘phase’ space, which in conjunction with the laws of 
mechanics entirely determines future states of that system. However, any empirical error in 
the estimation of the initial state prevents one from making reliable long-term predictions about 
the future state of the system. An even more problematic feature of such systems is that even 
if the initial state is known exactly, if it contains an irrational number (e.g. √2), then it is 
undecidable to know which machine precision will provide a trajectory that is the closest to the 
physical system that the model is trying to reproduce. The study and analysis of such systems, 
called chaotic systems, has opened-up new conceptual and mathematical perspectives in 
physics. Despite the fact that it is impossible to provide a reliable long-term prediction about 
one particular system, some regularities may emerge from the chaos: different trajectories of 
the same chaotic system may have the same fractal dimension or they may yield a sequence 
of pseudo-random numbers following a reproducible probability distribution. These 
developments have, for example, permitted the efficient computational study of 
thermodynamic equilibrium properties of complex systems, not by directly integrating their 
dynamical equations, but by using fictitious dynamical equations (e.g. Markov Chains) which 
sample the same probability distribution as that of the actual chaotic dynamics. In a sense, 
chaos is now seen as a regime that physical systems can be in, which carries its own set of 
laws to be discovered. 
The famous debate between Einstein and Bohr regarding quantum mechanics presents 
itself as a good example where an apparently undecidable question on the nature of 
uncertainty in quantum mechanics (i.e. is it inherent or due to incomplete knowledge?) 
becomes decidable by adding ampliative principles. Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen (EPR), in 
their seminal 1935 paper, proposed a reframing of this question; by relying on a specific 
definition of local realism they reached a form of closure and concluded that quantum 
mechanics is incomplete. This paper was instrumental in driving Bell’s argument that local 
“beables” only exist if certain inequalities are satisfied and the ensuing experimental works 
(e.g. Aspect’s 1980s experiments). Adopting the following notation: QM = “Quantum 
Mechanics”, EPR = “QM does not describe all elements of local reality” and BI = “Bell’s 
inequalities hold”, the chain of arguments reads: 
 𝐸𝑃𝑅	entails	(𝐵𝐼	and	(𝑄𝑀	entails	not	𝐵𝐼)) Not	(𝐵𝐼	and	(𝑄𝑀	entails	not	𝐵𝐼))	entails	not	𝐸𝑃𝑅		[contrapositive] 															Not	FBI	and	(QM	entails	not	BI)J		[Aspect's	experiments]											 Not	EPR 
 
This leads to the current view that quantum mechanics provides a complete description of 
reality and that the uncertainty of Quantum Mechanics is then inherent to “nature” so to speak. 
We have argued that the process of rephrasing undecidable philosophical questions as 
decidable questions and proceeding to take a stance was a defining feature of science. In the 
next section we are going to see how this view may help illuminate a particularly contentious 
problem in the philosophy of mind. 
 
Is the ghost in the shell?  
 
We finish this essay by discussing how the thesis we have developed in the previous 
sections can help us to appreciate the difficulties occurring in the debate about phenomenal 
consciousness. The so-called Hard Problem of consciousness put forward by D. Chalmers, 
among others, contends that providing answers to questions that are related to the nature of 
consciousness is beyond the scope of current scientific practice, particularly if current theories 
are considered to be the final say on any given question relating to experience. The main 
argument is that since consciousness is not currently acknowledged as a fundamental 
property of matter, and there does not seem to be any way to combine the currently accepted 
objective properties of matter that could lead to conscious subjective experience, there must 
be something missing. It is interesting to analyse Chalmers’ position as stressing the 
philosophical nature of the question “what is consciousness?” in the sense defined above, i.e. 
a question for which there was no method for answering at the time it was coined. Certainly, 
many avenues have been proposed, but no specific method for answering it has achieved 
consensus. What we mean by ‘method’ here is a consistent set of principles or hypotheses, 
possibly new ones, which would allow one to conclude the existence of consciousness (or 
lack thereof) in a given system. We now look briefly at positions such as illusionism, substance 
dualism and panpsychism, in an attempt to analyse which of these might enable a scientific 
formulation of the Hard Problem.  
Illusionism [8], proposes that there is no Hard Problem and that subjective experience is 
no more real than, say, a rainbow would be. In sum it is an illusion. On the surface, this position 
certainly takes a stance on the nature of consciousness but the stance itself appears to beg 
the question according to many observers [9]; to be the victim of an illusion actually feels “like 
something”, which requires phenomenal consciousness in the first place.  
Substance dualism contends that there is coexistence between a physical body and a soul; 
the former being governed by the laws of physics and the latter granting us subjective 
experience. Accounting for agency may require an interaction between these two substances 
which makes it a viable avenue for closure. But the set of principles required to make any such 
avenue decidable is still under construction as far as the authors are aware. For example, 
assuming interaction between a soul and a body may lead to deviations from our laws of 
physics, for example the conservation of energy [10]. The issue, though, is that these 
deviations, if ever seen, must be identified as evidence for an interaction between a soul and 
a body rather than some “new physics” not involving any soul. We are then back to contrastive 
underdetermination. Therefore, ampliative principles are still needed in order to generate 
scientific questions in the sense defined in this essay. 
Panpsychism contends that phenomenal consciousness is not an exclusive feature of 
human beings or even living organisms but that there could be some degree of consciousness 
in all physical systems a priori [11]. Some strong forms of panpsychism suggest that electrons 
have some degree of consciousness [12] while other versions grant consciousness based on 
some additional criteria. Panpsychism alone, however, is not enough to develop scientific 
‘daughter’ questions; as is the case for substance dualism, further principles are required.  
Functionalism is an example of such an additional principle in that it postulates the 
existence of some level of consciousness depending on the extent to which some objective 
function(s) can be emulated by a given system. Such a view appears to us as the closest to 
what we call a scientific question. Tononni’s Integrated Information Theory for example posits 
that a system which has some ability to take information as an input, ‘integrate’ it and then 
respond according to a cause-effect or ‘conceptual’ structure, must be assumed to have some 
degree of conscious experience determined by the level of information integration being 
displayed. In a similar vein, Tegmark suggests that degrees of consciousness may be 
associated with the structural pattern of communication channels in a system. In light of the 
thesis developed in this essay, these positions constitute viable methods for science to answer 
some questions about the nature of consciousness, thereby providing temporary closure to 
the philosophical questions for which we would have substituted their scientific translation. 
 
Closing comments 
 
In this essay, we have discussed the problems of uncertainty and undecidability faced by 
physics and most sciences. We have developed the idea that, far from being a new 
phenomenon, the existence of apparently unsolvable questions can be found in many places 
in the history of physics. We have also extended the discussion to show that most 
undecidability issues that the sciences are confronted with tend to revolve around a form of 
logically invalid induction. Finally, using supportive examples, we suggest that the creative 
frameworks proposed to address undecidable problems are in fact a defining feature of 
science, whereby what we called philosophical questions give birth to scientific questions that 
are decidable.   
In closing, we propose a quote [13] which we believe captures the impossible task of 
science which we have defended in this essay: 
 
“When Chuck Norris makes an inductive inference, it becomes deductive”. 
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